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Intercommunal tension in India has significantly heightened after the Hindu 
nationalist BJP government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi was re-elected 
by a large majority on 23 May 2019. Including also deputies from three 
local parties, the BJP formed the third National Democratic Alliance govern-
ment of India. Since then the BJP party and the government are often 
perceived as targeting the Muslim minority for political gains.  
The revocation of the special autonomy status of the Muslim majority 
state of Jammu and Kashmir under article 370 of the Indian constitution on 
5 August 20192 and the accompanying extensive security and police 
operations sparked a wide range of Muslim protest from the political to the 
civil and militant spectrum. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (CAA) 
which legalised Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian migrants 
from neighbouring states fleeing persecution before 2014 pointedly exclud-
ed Muslims from its application. The introduction of a National Register of 
Citizens (NRC), meant to distinguish between legal and illegal citizens and 
based on a 2003 amendment of the citizenship act,3 had already sparked 
unrest in 2019 when first implemented in Assam. Muslims of migrant origin 
were now required to prove their citizenship which raised significant 
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questions for parts of the Muslim population of Northeast India many of 
whom had arrived from Bangladesh or former East Pakistan. The citizenship 
law reform sparked protest by primarily young civil society activists who 
had organised a large-scale sit-in in Delhi on 22 February 2020. On the 
following days, from 23 to 25 February 2020, BJP and RSS activists 
organised progrom-like systematic violence against the protesters and 
other Muslims in Delhi leading to further demonstrations and intense battles 
with police. 
In yet another related development triggered by the Corona crisis, 
annual regional congregations of the missionary movement of the Tablighi 
Jama’at conducted with international participation in Delhi on 13-15 March 
were held responsible for the spread of the Corona virus. After that, Hindu 
nationalist firebrands targeted Muslims in general as a potential source of 
the virus. Muslim protest connected with those events was often organised 
by social grassroots activist, many of them Muslim, but by no means all, as 
the secular left across the religious and cultural spectrum also played a 
strong role in those responses. These dynamics again raised the question 
about Muslim voices and leadership in India. Observers pointed to the 
absence of Muslim leadership beyond the younger generation of those 
grassroots activists. Yet, as India’s Muslim population remains strongly 
divided along social, cultural, linguistic, sectarian, and geographic lines, 
Muslim activists in India cannot easily speak for the Indian Muslim 
community at large.  
This essay will begin with an introduction to the historical context of 
Muslim India from which current popular leaders emerged. Three subse-
quent sections will discuss traditional, local or regional, and modern 
leadership, which are three categories into which Islam in India can be 
conditionally divided, keeping in mind that these areas also overlap. A final 
section on the role of social media for the mobilisation of Indian Muslims 
examines important new trends in social and political activism that are 
challenging and shaping India’s Muslim leadership. 
Historical formation of popular Muslim leadership 
After the Indian subcontinent was divided in 1947 as a result of the Pakistan 
independence movement, Islamic groups and Muslim leaders who 
remained in India faced a fundamental dilemma. In order to gain legitimacy 
with the Indian government and their major ally, the Indian National 
Congress, the remaining Indian Muslim groups and leaders needed to 





legacy of partition that had rendered millions victim to communal rioting in 
the process of the population transfers between the young states of India 
and Pakistan. Yet partition had created a paradox for Muslim leadership in 
South Asia: the centers of Islamic learning, theological guidance, of culture 
and tradition remained in India and were largely absent from the new 
Muslim state of Pakistan.  
This inherent contradiction shaped the emergence of Muslim leadership 
in India and also affected the emergence of new popular Muslim leaders 
and their grassroots politics today in several ways. First, although no 
Muslim political party has established itself in the electoral system of India 
as a national force, the Muslim vote as a potential constituency continues 
to influence a substantial number of seats in parliament.4 Second, Muslim 
religious leaders remained devoted to the traditional conditions and forms 
of the practice of Islam while demonstrating little to no political ambition of 
their own. Third, national issues of Muslim politics have been taken up more 
by mainstream political parties than by religious organisations. The 
Congress Party and regional parties became prime movers in the public 
arena to articulate the concerns of Indian Muslims, joined by a number of 
clerics and public Muslim intellectuals, many of whom claimed the newly 
emerging constituency of "secular Muslims". At the same time, fourth, 
regional Muslim parties from South and East India generated a political 
revival of Muslim voices, albeit fragmented and shaped by local culture and 
ethnicity. 
The emergence of Muslim leadership in independent India can be roughly 
divided into three phases. During the first phase, immediately after parti-
tion, Indian Muslims had to grapple with the fact that despite the 
emergence of Pakistan as a state of Muslim majority provinces, in the 
independent state of India the issue of Muslim minority rights remained 
unresolved politically, socially, and culturally. Muslims retained a significant 
share in India’s population which continued to grow from 13.4 per cent in 
2001, to 14,23 per cent in 2011,5 exerting influence in a number of regions. 
At 172 million people in 2011, India’s Muslim population was roughly on 
par with that of Pakistan and Bangladesh, each. Yet, the Indian Muslim 
community also remained deeply divided, with the vast majority living in 
the Gangetic plains of north India, the historical areas of Muslim civilisation 
in the subcontinent, extending well into the East Indian states in the larger 
Assam region, and a small but very active and much more developed 
minority residing in the southern states, where Dravidian languages and 
cultures dominated. During this first phase, Indian Muslim leaders 
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deliberately renounced political ambitions and focused on rebuilding the 
religious and cultural identity of the community. 
A second phase was introduced by socio-economic and political changes 
that arrived with the modernisation processes of the 1970s, triggering the 
emergence of radical politics, regional, cultural, and ethnic conflict. 
Religious actors and groups with Hindu, Sikh, and also Muslim backgrounds 
became part of the identity politics of a new generation of mainly student 
activists. In the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim groups in India shared in the 
rising religious consciousness across the Muslim world and expanded 
religious institutions at a significant pace, not lagging much behind Pakistan 
or Bangladesh, albeit with very limited political drive. 
Globalisation and development marked the third phase of the leaders’ 
evolving emergence. In this phase, Muslim activism in India intensely 
refocused on the status and development of the Indian Muslim community, 
especially general education, the schooling of girls, and professional, 
technical, and computer education. At the same time, leadership initiatives 
largely remained in the hands of upper-class and upper-caste Ashraf 
Muslims. The Muslim community was seen as lagging behind other commu-
nities in India and as not equally sharing in the fruits of the continuous 
development upsurge since the 1990s. This was confirmed by the 2006 
Sachar Committee formed by the Indian government.6 More recent studies 
based on 2017-18 data7 stressed that this trend was continuing and still 
growing. The share of Muslims who completed graduation was 14 per cent 
in 2017-18, as against 18 per cent among the Dalits, 25 per cent among 
the Hindu Other Backward Castes group (OBCs), and 37 per cent among 
the Hindu upper castes. 
The gap between the Muslims and Hindu OBCs was 7 percentage points 
(ppt) in 2011-12 and has gone up to 11 ppt now. 'The gap between all 
Hindus and Muslims widened from 9 ppt in 2011-12 to 11 ppt in 2017-18.'8 
Muslim groups and leaders felt the need and desire to network globally 
much more intensely than before. Using the new opportunities their global 
cooperation related not only to religious issues, but also reflected social, 
cultural and political concerns. As demonstrated by the Deobandis or 
Tablighis, the historical centers of religious Muslim networks in India 
regained some of their significance in the process. Their followers were 
joined by diverse activists from across India, some of whom followed a 
more local orientation while others were more modernist. The inter-
connection with the quickly growing Indian Muslim diaspora had a growing 





Traditional Muslim networks and new leadership formats 
With the absence of a recognised national Muslim leadership, most 
religious-minded Indian Muslims continue to look for guidance to their local 
imams. Those include their elders in mosques, madaris (plural of madrasa, 
or Islamic school), and religious associations. These activists should be 
considered when looking for new trends in Muslim grassroots politics. 
Though still strongly divided by old sectarian differences, these local leaders 
adapt their modes of operation to new trends of communication. And they 
pay much more attention than previously to non-religious issues such as 
general education and development aimed at the social status of the Muslim 
community.  
Increasingly, and more so under the BJP government since 2014, the 
religious scholars (ulama) negotiate with the government for public space 
of their communities. For this purpose, also communal inter-religious 
interaction is used such as direct talks with Hindu-nationalist RSS repre-
sentatives. Emphasising the need to support a united India against sepa-
ratism, the Ahl-i Hadith representative, Maulana Asghar Ali Imam Mahdi 
Salafi, surprised many political observers when in September 2019 he 
supported the Modi government on the abolition of paragraph 370 for 
Kashmir and also on the citizens register (NRC)9 which critical secular 
Muslim activists regarded as means to deem Muslim and Christian 
minorities as 'illegal immigrants.'10 He also met with RSS representatives 
hailing the Supreme Court decision of 9 November 2019 regarding the Babri 
Masjid case in Ayodhya on a contested site where a Hindu temple and a 
Muslim mosque had been build over the centuries.11 They were joined in 
their support on Kashmir for the Modi government by the JUH and its 
General Secretary, Maulana Mahmood Madani, when they together met the 
Interior Minister of the Indian government, Amit Shah, in September 
2019.12  
For the Shia, the Chairman of the Uttar Pradesh Central Shia Waqf Board, 
administering Shia religious endowments, Waseem Rizvi, tried to use the 
political impact of the Modi government decisions. He made the political—
and sectarian—argument on 09 December 2019 that Shia should be 
included in the list of persecuted persons in the contentious citizenship act, 
due to the pressure and violence they were facing in Sunni majority 
countries in South and West Asia or the Middle East which would make 
them legitimate migrants in India.13 In India, it is hotly debated whether 
these religious leaders accommodate the BJP and RSS out of fear or out of 
social and political calculations in the face of a growing and resolute 
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generation of younger Muslim activists increasingly crossing the sectarian 
divides. 
At the same time, these clerics contributed to the transformation of 
religious institutions. For their own communities, they built networks that 
encompass not only traditional religious associations operating out of 
madaris, but also modern Muslim schools teaching a secular curriculum, 
and madaris for girls along with modern girls’ schools. These schools are 
operated through Muslim NGOs that have expanded all over India. Often 
these institutions are cross-linked and coordinated by activists who bridge 
the religious and the secular realms effortlessly, as will be shown below. 
They are also engaged in business with, invest in, or direct some of the 
new Muslim media. 
Over the years many centers of religious learning have built impressive 
websites containing a large amount of information. A prominent example 
is the traditional seminary of Deoband featuring information regarding 
curriculum, the history of the seminary, magazines in Urdu (Darul Ulum) 
and Arabic (al-Dai), ordering information for their books in Urdu and 
English, an online service for religious verdicts (fatawa), and a photo 
gallery.14 The other orthodox seminary of North India, Nadwatul Ulama, 
has taken a similar approach in its website, which provides easy connec-
tions with the seminary’s many Indian branches.15 The Deobandi-
dominated JUH on its website introduces the association’s social and 
religious projects.16 
Adherents of the Barelwi tradition of Sufi-oriented Islam, which has 
locally appropriated the term Sunni, use modern media to connect to each 
other, although their institutions and associations are less formally 
organised. Internet blogs such as Sunni News not only help to circulate 
news and theological concepts but also promote sectarian debate.17 The 
youthful missionary movement of this tradition, Sunni Dawat-e Islami,18 
which formed after the model of the Tablighi Jama’at and their Barelwi 
pendant, the Dawat-e Islami in Pakistan, possesses a modern web 
presence, offering podcasts, an e-journal, and e-books. 
The Ahl-e Hadith in India led by the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadees Hind 
(MJAH)19 is known for their strict legal approach focusing on the Quran and 
the Hadith while shunning the Muslim law schools. Their close association 
with Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia earned them the connotation of 
Salafi—used primarily by themselves—and Wahhabi—used by others.20 At 




In the Indian context, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB, 
founded in 1972) acquired importance as a reference institution, which it 
further promoted through its website documenting its decisions.21 Run by 
ulama, the board’s decisions have a fatwa-like status, as it tries to reconcile 
different Sunni legal opinions. The board’s members also intervene in the 
making and reformation of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) on issues of 
marriage or divorce, sometimes causing much public controversy. The 
group’s chairman has often been vocal in public Indian discourse. Repeat-
edly the chairman has come from the Nadwa school; the previous chair was 
the famous Sayyid Ali Hasan Nadwi. The current chairman is Syed 
Mohammad Rabey Hasani.22 But its authority is not unchallenged as 
dissenting scholars with a Shia background and women activists formed 
rival boards, the All India Shia Personal Law Board (AISPLB),23 and the All 
India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board (AIMWPLB) both founded in 
2005.24  
MPL evolved under British rule when the courts started to make a 
selective reference to Islamic law while hearing civil cases involving 
Muslims and promoting legislation on its partial application. It was formal-
ised when two related laws were adopted in 1937 (Muslim Personal Law 
(Shariat) Application Act) and 1939 (Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act). 
Today, the board is an interface of religious scholars with the Indian state 
and public Muslim intellectuals in legal matters arising from the prescrip-
tions of Islam. The most recent example was the debate on the abolition of 
the Islamic divorce practice of pronouncing tripple talaq (repudiation) for 
instant divorce without reconciliation. Although this debate had started 
much earlier, the BJP government heavily pushed for a decision. The Indian 
Supreme Court abolished the practice on 22 August 201725 and Parliament 
adopted the The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 
2019 criminalising the practice with retrograde effect from 19 September 
2019.26 The traditional Islamic parties did not oppose the reform, the more 
as India’s Muslim neighbours had all reformed this practice already. But the 
AIMPLB rejected the legal intervention on behalf of the state.   
In addition, individual scholars attract public attention through their 
participation in religious and political debates. Among the Deobandis, 
Maulana Nadeem ul-Wajidi is a typical example. A graduate of the Darul 
Ulum Deoband, he is a member of the working committee of the seminary’s 
alumni association. He is also president of the provincial organisation of 
Deobandi ulama for the province of Uttar Pradesh. Additionally, Maulana 
Nadeem ul-Wajidi runs his own online Deobandi madrasa, Darul Ulum 
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Online,27 and takes part in public debate through articles in Urdu language 
newspapers. 
On the Barelwi side he is matched by scholars such as Maulana Muham-
mad Nasir Misbahi28 and Allama Yasin Akhtar Nisbahi, owner of the Barelwi 
publishing house Darul Qalam.29 Tauqeer Raza Khan, the great-grandson 
of the Barelwi founder Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921), is involved in 
regional politics of the Uttar Pradesh state through the Ittehad-e-Millat 
Council (IMC) which was represented in the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Legislative 
Assembly 2012-17 from the Bhojipura Constituency.30 A vocal spokesman 
for religious Shia believers is Maulana Kalbe Sadiq, India’s best-known Shia 
Muslim scholar and vice president of the All India Muslim Personal Law 
Board.31 He, in contrast with Waseem Rizvi (as above), went out to support 
protesters against the new CAA law in Lucknow in January 2020.32 
The Madani family represents another prominent example of individual 
activism in the Islamic field. It is closely associated with the Deoband 
seminary, and the JUH. The family operates at the intersection of Muslim 
religious scholarship and party politics. Its members have struck various 
alliances with the Congress Party, the Samajwadi Party (SP) of Uttar 
Pradesh, the competing Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and the Rashtriya Lok 
Dal (RLD). At the same time they also support private secular schools in 
the region.33 Regional parties such as the SP and the BSP addressing the 
concerns of marginalised lower castes—like Dalits—and classes, also 
appealed to Muslim constituencies, primarily in Uttar Pradesh. So did the 
more left-leaning Janata Dal (United)—JDU—Party in Bihar. However they 
were often criticised for failing to contribute to the development of local 
Muslim communities despite their shares in power.34 
Local Muslim initiatives and regional leadership in the South and 
East Indian States 
Historically the structure of religious debate and activism among Indian 
Muslims is dominated by the traditional sects of the Deobandis, Barelwis, 
Ahl-i Hadith (Salafi), Shia, and dissenting groups such as the Ahmadiyya 
(Reetz 2006). Yet recently, a growing number of local initiatives have 
transcended the demarcations of sectarian affiliations in India. This 
development is often connected with education and development projects 
to benefit local Muslim communities. More typically those projects are found 
in the southern Indian states (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) or on the east coast 
(Assam), outside the historical heartlands of Indian Islam in the north-




A typical example of this locally rooted activism is Badruddin Ajmal (born 
in 1955), a merchant of Arabian scents, hailing from Assam. He is a 
graduate of the Deoband seminary and helped modernise some of the 
seminary’s departments; for example, he was instrumental in introducing 
and expanding the teaching of English-language and computer skills there. 
In Hojai, Assam, Ajmal runs a welfare foundation and trust locally known 
for a state of the art charitable hospital (the Haji Abdul Majid Memorial 
Hospital and Research Center).35 He also established and directed Markaz-
ul-Maarif (Center of Knowledge) in 1982,36 a successful NGO in the 
education sector operating in Assam, and a training institute for madrasa 
graduates, Markazul Maarif Education and Research Centre (MMERC) in 
1994, which was founded in New Delhi and later shifted to Mumbai.37 In 
2006, Ajmal founded a local Muslim party, the Assam United Democratic 
Front, which surprised observers by immediately winning eight seats of the 
state assembly.38 Since 2009, the party was renamed as All-India United 
Democratic Front. The party held 14 seats in the fourteenth Assam 
Assembly elected in 2016.39 Ajmal was re-elected to the national 
parliament for three consecutive terms from his Dhubri (Lok Sabha 
constituency).40  
West Bengal 
The reformist Sufi Shrine of Furfura Sharif located in Hoogly district 
represents yet another type of social engagement of religious institutions. 
The five sons of the Shrine’s founder, Pir Abu Bakr Siddique (1859-1939), 
followed the concept of their father who was comparatively conservative 
for a Sufi cleric in that he opposed practices not enshrined in the Quran and 
the Hadith, such as singing, dancing, but also personal worship of 
shrinekeepers – the Pirs – like himself (Matin 2018: 28, 29). Their constin-
uously growing impact was partly based on their cultivation of the Bengali 
language as another Muslim language of communication, besides Urdu and 
Persian. They extended a network of mosques, madaris and mixed 
religious-modern schools not only across West Bengal, the neighbouring 
states of Assam and Tripura, but also to Bangladesh and the Bengali-
speaking diaspora in the UK and North America.41 Prominent represen-
tatives of the shrine network are Alama Pir Mohammad Saifuddin Siddique, 
the Chief Patron of Furfura Sharif and eldest grand-son of Abu Bakr 
Siddique, as well as Ibrahim and Kasem Siddique who are also engaged in 
local politics challenging the Trianmol Congress Party TCP. Local followers 
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increasingly treat them like local governance representatives when asking 
for their interventions to solve problems of getting access to schools, 
hospitals etc.42  
Kerala 
Similar local initiatives have been established in Kerala. This southwestern 
state is known for its high literacy, an influential but moderate Communist 
movement, and a strong Christian minority influence. It also has a close-
knit Muslim community of the so-called Moplahs who can be traced all the 
way back to the advent of Islam on Indian soil. In Kerala, local branches of 
all-India associations have gone their own way by resolutely introducing 
quality education not only on Islam but also on general subjects. These 
groups are active in interfaith dialogue and social rehabilitation. This 
notably applies to the Samastha Kerala Jamiat-ul-Ulema broadly following 
the Sufi/Barelwi doctrinal orientation. It was founded in 1926 and split into 
two factions in 1984 named after their leaders, E.K. Aboobacker Musliyar 
(1957-96) and A.P. Aboobacker Musliyar (b. 1931). The EK faction engaged 
with the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) wheras the AP faction is said 
to support left-wing politics in the state. Also the IUML itself split into 
factions which took turns in participating in alternating coalition politics of 
the state (cf. Prabhash 2000). Except for the second term 1957-62 when 
its representative joined as an independent, the IUML was continuously 
present in the national parliament of India with one to three deputies since 
the first parliamentary elections in 1952, though with a distinctly local and 
regional flavor. It was under the Congress-led government of Manmohan 
Singh in 2004, that its representative was holding a ministerial post in the 
federal government, E. Ahamed as Minister of State of External Affairs.43 
In Kerala, it switched between coalitions with Congress and the local 
Communist Party. 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh 
The IUML also has visible influence in the southeastern state of Tamil 
Nadu.44 In this state, Muslim groups and institutions have revived in a 
major way that is strongly marked by local Tamil culture and ethno-nation-
alism. Another distinct local center of Islamic tradition and activism is 
Hyderabad, once the capital of the famed principality of the Nizam of Hyder-
abad and today part of Telangana.45 In both Tamil Nadu and Hyderabad a 
number of small militant groups emerged in the past that either were 
quickly dispersed or were suppressed by the state security forces. In both 
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states, Muslim NGOs significantly increased their involvement in the 
education of local Muslims. In the local politics of Hyderabad, the All India 
Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen continues to play an important role for Muslim 
mobilisation.46 The articulate barrister Asaduddin Owaisi for the fourth time 
retained the party seat in the seventeenth assembly of the national 
parliament (Lok Sabha) elected in May in 2019.47 Although sometimes 
dubbed Islamist, this party is more moderate and community-oriented in 
character. It recently expanded all-India activities seeking to bridge sec-
tarian divides and ethno-political polarisation among Indian Muslims. A 
second AIMIM deputy, Syed Imtiaz Jaleel, represented Aurangabad consti-
tuency in Maharashtra in the same assembly.48 
Jammu and Kashmir 
The former northern state of Jammu and Kashmir presented a special case 
as it had been contested between India and Pakistan since the time of 
partition. Since 1990 particularly, the Kashmir valley has been marked by 
an insurgency that has been fuelled partly by Pakistan-based groups and 
government agencies. The Indian-controlled part of the state had a Muslim 
majority of 68,31 per cent that tended to favor either the Congress Party 
or one of the local Muslim parties. 4 out of 22 districts had been Hindu-, 
one Buddhist majority districts, all other Muslim majority.49  
When the BJP government abolished article 370 of the Indian 
constitution thereby revoking the special status of the Jammu and Kashmir 
state on 5 August 2019, it converted the state into 2 Union Territories (UT) 
enjoying less political and administrative independence, the Buddhist-
majority Ladakh UT and the Muslim-majority Jammu & Kashmir UT with 
effect from 31 October 2019. To stifle political dissent the government 
imposed harsh limitations on local Muslim political parties and their leaders 
many of which were put under house arrest. Communication on the internet 
was restricted and public curfews were imposed repeatedly. Security forces 
used the restrictions which were also ascerbated by the Corona pandemic 
to confront Kashmir resistance fighters in their hide-outs.   
Before that constitutional intervention despite the many years of conflict, 
Muslim politics had developed in full diversity. The two most well-known 
parties had been the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC)—led 
by Omar Abdullah (b. 1970), and the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Demo-
cratic Party (PDP)—led by Mehbooba Mufti (b. 1959). The latter was the 
last chief minister from 2016 to 2018 before the restructuring, in a coalition 
with the BJP which withdrew from the coalition government on 19 June 
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201850 after which the state was governed, first by the Governor, and then 
by President’s rule.51 Central rule continues in the UT after 31 October 
through the new Lieutenant-Governors. The main ideological and political 
support for the insurgency came from the Jama’at-i Islami Jammu and 
Kashmir (JIJK - Islamic Party), which, although autonomous and historically 
predating partition, is strongly influenced by its Pakistan-based sister 
party.52 In Indian-controlled Kashmir, it was banned for 5 years under the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 on 28 February 2019, right after 
militants had attacked an army convoy on 14 February 2019.53 Its affiliated 
militant organisation Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)54 is operating in the 
territory while its leader Sayeed Salahudeen (b. 1946) is residing on the 
Pakistan-controlled side of the state. Its last local commander Riyaz Naikoo 
was killed during a security force operation in his native village of Beighpora 
in south Kashmir on 04 May 2020.55 
The JIJK is a member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) that 
unites appx. 26 organisations favoring either joining Pakistan, indepen-
dence or at least strong autonomy for the territory.56 Hurriyat consists of 
three factions due to political differences how to approach the current 
situation in the state. One of the factions is currently led by Mirwaiz 
Mohammad Umar Farooq (b. 1973) who as the leading cleric (Mirwaiz) of 
the UT is also conducting the Friday prayers in the Srinagar historical 
mosque. Although Muslim leaders from Kashmir have little impact on 
politics elsewhere in India, the conflict in itself has often served to polarise 
Muslim activists across the country and to motivate militant and radical 
elements. While the political and social tension is running high—notably 
since the revocation of the autonomous status, the militant conflict level 
seems comparatively low, partly because the present leadership in Pakistan 
is careful not to give the BJP reasons for further confrontation, and partly 
because of the extensive security clampdown.  
Since 1990 the Kashmir valley also saw a significant rise in religious 
engagements of Muslims. Most prominent are the Tablighi Jama’at—and its 
local headquarter at the Bait-al-Kareem Mosque in Srinagar in Tawheed 
Abad in Srinagar,57 its competitor from the Barelwi missionary movement, 
Dawat-i Islami, at the Fazain-e-Madina centre at Jamalatta, Srinagar,58 and 
also groups of the Ahl-i Hadith59 and Shia. The latter are a dominant force 
in the Kargil district, UT Ladakh.60 
Muslim politicians particularly took issue with the new domicile law which 
was introduced for the UT Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh on 20 May 2020.61 
It replaced another abrogated constitution article 35A which had hitherto 
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reserved employment and property access to local residents. The new law 
allowed to issue new domicile certificates to Indian citizens for the territory 
which was strictly controlled under the previous arrangements. Muslim 
politicians argue this move betrays the political intent of the government 
to ultimately change the demographic composition of Jammu and Kashmir 
in favour of non-Muslim citizens. This would potentially remove its Muslim 
majority status among the Indian states and territories.62 Government 
representatives contended it was unfair not to grant such privileges to local 
citizens who had lived in the state for 70 years without getting such 
privileges. This notably concerned central government servants. This move 
was supposedly meant also to favour economic migration thereby accel-
erating economic development in Jammu and Kashmir.63 
Modernising Muslim leadership 
The modernisation of Muslim leadership was primarily driven by lay Muslims 
and the demands of development. It was fuelled by discontent with a 
continuing concentration of leadership in the hands of "Ashraf" Muslims 
representing upper class and caste strata. Religious conflict with Hindu 
nationalists also provoked new leadership aspirations. Changes took shape 
through the formation of new bodies and institutions. They were different 
in maintaining a separate identity from both the established sectarian 
religious associations and the mainstream political parties that had pre-
viously been the main outlets for Muslim public opinion. In practice, 
however, a number of links exist. Broadly speaking, these modern organi-
sations can be divided in two categories: those related to religious issues 
and those related to community welfare, education and social rights. At the 
same time existing institutions for religious education underwent gradual 
changes by incorporating secular subjects both for vocational training and 
regular academic qualification.      
Nowadays it is an important career opportunity for Indian Muslims to 
become involved in Muslim NGOs. Many Muslim graduates, not only of reli-
gious schools but also of secular schools, opt to start new NGOs only to 
create jobs for themselves. These fusion tenancies have led to increasing 
visibility of Muslim secularism which is a long-standing feature of cultural 
and political life of modern India.     
In addition we see growing grassroots engagement on social and political 
issues where often the student community is involved. The educational 
trajectory of Muslim students increasingly underwent transformation where 





Muslim identity and where students from religious schools and sectarian 
organisations get involved in public mass activism. This activism was partly 
feeding on communal and social tension and cleavages continuously and 
more recently also increasingly faced by Muslims of marginalised social 
background. Occasionally and regionally it also generated militancy or local 
collaboration with international militant networks.           
Modern Muslim religious institutions 
In the area of religious institutions, there are a number of Muslim think-
tanks and NGOs that currently exert a significant influence on religious 
debate and mobilisation. A representative example is the Institute of 
Objective Studies (IOS) in Delhi, directed by Mohammed Manzoor Alam (b. 
1945).64 The institute appears close to the Jamaat-i Islami-i Hind (JIH) and 
its modernising aspirations. In religious matters, the IOS follows the 
orthodoxy of Deoband and the JIH. The IOS has also become a recognised 
player in the academic field, attracting professors from public universities65 
and circulating its own academic journals.66 Through a variety of interlinked 
institutions, IOS exerts a wide influence on religious-minded Muslim intel-
lectuals. The group’s chairman, Manzoor Alam, is also the general secretary 
of the Delhi All India Milli Council (AIMC),67 which promotes public initiatives 
in the area of Muslim personal law and tries also to reconcile different 
sectarian approaches. The AIMC has generated a number of independent 
regional branches for Rajasthan,68 North Gujarat,69 Karnataka/Bangalore,70 
etc. Ideologically these institutions follow the Islamisation of knowledge 
initiative. The IOS is listed as the Indian affiliation of the International 
Institutes of Islamic Thought, which are part of the same network as the 
Islamic Universities of Pakistan and Malaysia.71 The Milli Council, in turn, is 
in close contact with the All India Muslim Personal Law Board. 
Modern Muslim community welfare institutions  
Those institutions related to the welfare of the community are typically 
training centers or private schools with government-recognised degree 
courses in all levels of education: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Lately 
many religious associations and madaris have created such educational 
facilities. According to inquiries in Deoband town, out of one thousand girls 
attending a girls’ madrasa—a new rising phenomenon in itself—'at least 40 
per cent want to work […] .Many girls from madrasas go on to join colleges 
and institutes run by madrasa alumni in cities such as Meerut, Muzaffar-
nagar and Aligarh.'72 Another interesting example is the Jame-ul-uloom at 
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the Jamia Mosque in Bangalore which encompasses not only religious 
courses but also secular programmes from girls education to technical 
vocational training and college degrees.73 The so-called high-tech madrasa 
Jamiatul Hidaya in Jaipur, Rajastan,74 which is named after Maulana 
Mohammed Hidayat Ali Mojaddidi, and currently run by Maulana Moham-
mad Fazlur Rahim Mujaddidi, established full-fledged public education 
courses for secondary and technical education in addition to religious 
courses.75 They also launched a number of related institutions such as the 
English medium Imam Rabbani Public Schools in different cities of the 
region.76  
In the field of higher education the private Darul Huda Islamic University 
(DIHU) in Chemmad, and the Al Jamia Al Islamia (JI), Santhapuram, 
Kerala,77 deserve special attention.78 They offer courses that integrate 
religious education with secular subjects, such as Maths, Social Sciences, 
History, Physics, and Chemistry. In addition, the JI parent foundation 
Islamic Mission Trust (IMT) Santhapuram, founded the Al Jamia Arts & 
Science College in 2010, affiliated with the University of Calicut.79 They are 
seen as having upgraded Islamic education to a high-quality public edu-
cation level while also adding options for further studies in the arts and 
sciences.80 
The All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (AIMMM) must also be 
mentioned here. The AIMMM is a coordination council where public intel-
lectuals and Muslim clerics sit together to discuss Muslim issues. Although 
in itself the council does not have a great impact on the Muslim masses, 
the AIMMM has nevertheless helped coordinate and articulate public Muslim 
aspirations in India to a notable degree. Between 2012-15, the council was 
led by Zafarul-Islam Khan (b. 1948), a Muslim intellectual who combines 
his activities in the media business through the community newspaper Milli 
Gazette81 with public activism and charity toward the Muslim community 
through his registered trust, the Charity Alliance.82 Being the son of 
Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (see p. 21), Khan passed through traditional 
madrasa education (Nadwa) and secular schooling (he possesses a PhD 
from Manchester University). The current general secretary of the AIMMM 
is Mujtaba Farooq who continues coordination activities among Muslim 






Students and grassroots street activism 
The inter-religious violence in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 primarily 
directed by Hindu radicals against Muslims became another watershed for 
Muslim mobilisation. It also rekindled the memory of the destruction of the 
Babur Mosque in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 by militant Hindu nation-
alists (cf. Hasan 1997). These events created a strong impulse to counter 
anti-Muslim activities more forcefully. New initiatives for a more politicised 
Islamist leadership however largely remained a fringe phenomenon. The 
most prominent was the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) that 
existed between 1977 and 2001 (Arosoaie 2018; Fair 2010). It was founded 
as the student wing of the JIH at the campus of Aligarh Muslim University 
(AMU) in Uttar Pradesh. After a period of Islamist student activism while 
running numerous ideological magazines in Urdu, SIMI was banned in 
September 2001 after 9/11 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 
of 1967 (UAPA). SIMI was alleged to have endorsed Jihad and the 
establishment of a Caliphate governance system in India and South Asia. 
It praised al-Qaeda, the Taliban and condemned the US intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
Supposedly it was also linked with other Pakistan-based terrorist 
organisations, such as Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e Mohammadi (JeM) 
which were associated with bombing attacks in Indian cities since 2000. 
Since then the ban has been renewed under the said Act every two years, 
most recently 31 January 2019.84 Under recent modifications of UAPA, 
critics argued that practically no checking of evidence is condoned any-
more.85 The immediate involvement of SIMI cadres in militant acts before 
their ban remained contentious. But a certain faction and several of its 
former members apparently engaged in the Indian Mujahidin (IM), a 
militant outfit that supposedly emerged in 2001 after the last public con-
vention of SIMI. The IM were held responsible for several rounds of bomb 
attacks and explosive devices. Their theological foundations though 
seemed questionable as they appeared more to be driven by frustrations 
of marginalised urban Muslim youth taking gangster-style revenge of anti-
Muslim riots and campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s.86 
As the wide-spread former intellectual cader of SIMI was continuing its 
ideological commitment, SIMI’s ban is said to have generated new activist 
initiatives. Groups such as the Movement for the Revival of the Global 
Muslim Community, the Ummah (Tehreek-e-Ahyaa-e-Ummat, TEU), the 
Movement for Students at Arabic Schools, madrasas (Tehreek-Talaba-e-
Arabia, TTA), the Movement for the Protection of Islamic Monuments and 
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Symbols (Tahrik Tahaffuz-e-Sha’air-e-Islam, TTSI) and the Islamic Union 
(Wahdat-e-Islami)87 created platforms for madrasa students, clerics and 
political activists. Publications such as the Islamic Voice,88 produced by 
Sadathullah Khan from Bengaluru since 1987, were part of the larger ideo-
logical and religious network loosely affiliated with the JIH, partly because 
of its concept reconciling belief with political and civic engagement. 
But since 1981, and more formally since its ban 2001, the JIH had 
distanced itself from SIMI and rather promoted its own Students Islamic 
Organisation of India (SIO).89 Their dissent was characteristic of the 
different political engagements where SIMI opposed Arafats visit to India 
in 1981 whom it regarded as a Western "puppet" while JIH regarded him 
as a symbol of Palestinian politics.90  
The SIO over the years became more engaged in society and public life. 
It invested in political, intellectual and academic activities where it increa-
singly identified with the values and demands of the constitution of India 
that it now under the Modi government felt compelled to defend in the 
name of Muslims being one of the marginalised communities of India.91 
Many of their current leaders hail from highly developed regions of India, 
such as Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and Kerala.92 This is an 
interesting contrast with the long-time dominance of public Islamic engage-
ment by north-Indian entities partly promoting the heritage of the Moghul 
empire. Some of the SIO public functions and debates on the other hand, 
address both political activists and a more general public and also academic 
audience. This was demonstrated by conferences such as the "All India 
History Summit" on 29, 30 September 2018,93 and  the "India International 
Islamic Academic Conference of the SIO" on 8-9 October 2016.94 The SIO 
also increasingly engaged in urban street activism. It played a major role 
during the protests against the modified CAA law. Two female students and 
SIO activists, Ladeeda Sakhaloon and Ayesha Renna, became the female 
faces of the confrontational protest at the Jamia Millia University Delhi on 
12 December 2019.95 Also the protest in Indian-controlled Kashmir was 
strongly influenced by SIO activists. While liberal and secular activists first 
hailed them, they later attacked their commitment to religious slogans and 
values. 
Muslim secularism and social marginalisation in India 
Yet, over the years the nature of secular activism has also pluralised. In 
South Asia, and notably in India, it is common that Muslim activists who 
would identify themselves as secular or secularists have been significantly 
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articulate in the public arena. This approach is inspired by the Indian 
interpretation of secularism in the tradition of Gandhi. It is based on the 
separation of state and religion while showing each religion equal respect 
and protection. For secular Muslims, matters of faith are private. A prime 
example of such an activist was Asghar Ali Engineer (1939-2013), founder 
and director of the Mumbai Center for the Study of Society and Secularism 
(CSSS) which is currently led by his son Irfan Engineer. Asghar Ali Engineer 
was a Bohra Ismaili and received religious training from his father who was 
a cleric. As a public intellectual, Engineer wrote extensively on the civil, 
economic, and social rights of the Muslim community from a center-left 
perspective.96 An equally well-known and vocal representative of this group 
was Mushirul Hasan (1949-2018)97, an outstanding, widely published 
historian and former vice chancellor of Jamia Millia University. Politically 
Hasan was associated with the Muslim voice in the Congress Party. 
The social concerns of mainly low-class Muslims have been championed 
by secular and left-leaning groups such as the  All India Backward Muslim 
Morcha (AIBMM) founded by Dr. Ejaz Ali in 1994 (Khanam 2013). The 
Pasmanda (Backward) Muslim Mahaz (Front) PMM was founded by Ali 
Anwar Ansari in 1998 in Patna, Bihar. These organisations aspired to repre-
sent Muslims who are descended from Hindu converts standing outside the 
caste system as so-called outcasts or Dalits (Sikand 2007). Hindu nation-
alists have denied this status to outcast-origin Muslims and Christians. The 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes - SC) Order, 1950 deliberately excluded all 
non-Hindus from caste-based affirmative action programmes, although 
those were later extended to Sikhs and Buddhists: '[…] 3. Notwithstanding 
anything contained in paragraph 2, no person who professes a religion 
different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed 
to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.'98   
It is in the light of such rulings adopted not under BJP but Congress rule, 
that the Muslim protest against the new citizenship law CAA gained momen-
tum as Muslim citizens are potentially turned into aliens, it is argued. Yet 
the complexity of the issue is highlighted by the fact that certain sections 
of Muslim Dalits, notably Muslim refugees in West Bengal and other states 
of the North-East, have supported the BJP and the new citizenship reform 
because they believe 'that the CAA makes it possible for them to acquire 
Indian citizenship' by providing documents of their Indian citizen status 
whereas the original citizenship law automatically identified Muslim refu-
gees as illegal immigrants where they potentially faced arrest or ended 
up in a detention camp.99 
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Social media and new trends in India’s Muslim leadership 
Over the last 20 years, the radical expansion of social media platforms and 
their influence has transformed grassroots mobilisation of Muslims in India. 
These changes affected as much the religious institutions and networks, as 
the political, social and educational. On the side of preaching this impact 
has examplarily been embodied by the continuing and expanding country-
wide and global mobilisation of followers of the Tablighi Jama’at, the Sunni 
Deobandi preaching movement, with its national and global headquarters 
in Nizamuddin, Delhi. Another prime example has been the growing 
national and international impact of the televangelism of Zakir Naik follow-
ing the conservative and purist Ahl-i Hadith doctrine. 
Their rise exemplifies several elements of the new trends in popular 
Muslim leadership. They both draw heavily on the newfound religiosity 
among the rising middle classes of urban India, indicating both the potential 
but also the limits of this appeal. Though this phenomenon of religious 
resurgence may be of comparitively recent origin among Indian Muslims, it 
is not confined to them. Similar middle-class religiosity has been helping 
the ascent of the Hindu-nationalist forces of the BJP since the 1990s. Their 
success also points to the importance of new formats and media in pursuing 
religious propagation. They both reflect national as well as global trends. 
They are intensely religious but at the same time also appeal to secular 
trends such as rising social engagement of the younger generation and a 
growing market competition of religious formats. 
The Tablighi Jama’at heavily intensified its engagement with the social 
media partly as a result of internal conflicts over leadership and the 
direction of its theological and organisational orientation. In November 
2015 a conflict emerged over the succession of leadership where the Indian 
centre (Markaz) in Nizamuddin, Delhi, and its leader (Amir), Maulana Saad 
Kandhelawi  (b. 1965)100, found themselves in tense conflict with the centre 
in Pakistan at Raiwind, near Lahore, and the global council of the move-
ment—Alami Shura—anchored there.101 The conflict also developed into a 
conceptual argument whether the preaching movement is to be led 
properly by a Shura or an Amir. The Shura which had been re-configured 
at the annual meeting (ijtima’) in Raiwind in November 2015 challenged 
Maulana Saad while he challenged the re-composition of the Shura without 
his participation.102 
The disagreement developed into a quarrel and contest for leadership 
prompting the emergence of two rival factions which primarily through 
social media mobilisation have now established themselves world-wide. In 
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the process both factions established new social media accounts that 
squarely attacked the other side, on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Con-
frontation between the factions also expanded beyond South Asia globally, 
notably to the UK.103 Yet followers seemed to be undeterred to take sides 
in the rivalry. Some of the online testimony suggests that this in fact has 
led to a further growth of the movement where both factions now hold their 
meetings, in almost all Muslim communities and countries in parallel. Other 
testimony suggests that many followers now take part in the sessions of 
both the factions.104  
The continuing strong mass appeal of the movement became evident 
also during the Corona pandemy when heavily-attended events in India 
(and other countries) turned into hotspots of infections. While this pheno-
menon was not unlike religious gatherings in other parts of the world, in 
India the Hindu nationalists used the occasion to label the virus a Muslim 
scourge. This debate largely played out through social media. The Tablighi 
Jama’at was first on the defensive as it also had initially talked down the 
virus threat. After its infected activists recovered, the TJ mobilised its 
followers to offer themselves as donators of blood for plasma treatment of 
patients thereby hoping to counter the ideological and political campaign 
against them.105 
Zakir Naik’s organisation, the Islamic Research Foundation (IRF), repre-
sented the type of missionary "dawa" activism that provoked inter-
sectarian tension and generated increasing political pressure in South Asia. 
After a terrorist attack in the name of Islam at a café in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
in 2016, one of the attackers was allegedly inspired by Naik’s preaching. 
Bangladesh authorities soon banned Naik’s Online Television Channel Peace 
TV. India followed suit and the Indian government imposed a 5-year ban 
on his IRF institute on 17 November 2016 for radicalising Muslim youth and 
masses 'to commit terrorist attacks' while also addressing alleged money-
laundering.106 India started extradition proceedings with Malaysia where 
Naik had gone and where he had received a permanent residence status. 
While this process did not sginificantly diminish his impact on national and 
global Islamic online communication, it led several formats in India to 
currently observing a cautious distance. For instance, the religious website 
Islamic Voice (a.o.) no longer features his contributions on its website.107 
After the ban its editorial "Reflections on a Ban" in December 2016 distanc-
ed the journal from his sectarian views which were argued to lack com-
passion towards other faiths and seen as uncompatible with religions and 
faiths being a 'private domain of individual in a secular society.'108 
FORUM 
287 
But Naik did not only represent an ideological commitment. Socially his 
project reflected the growing importance of competition and of market 
forces in the religious field.109 His theological trajectory was proto-typical 
for other new Islamic preachers: he went from being a former follower of 
popular Islam with Sufi roots when he was a student of Ahmed Deedat, 
who hailed from a Barelwi background, to a very activist reformist position 
that some described as Islamist and others as Salafi.  
Naik’s project in many ways was a media ministry. The new media 
formats are very much connected with the global communication revolution 
in the wake of globalisation. He refined media techniques such as the 
production and dissemination of CDs, video courses, and in 2006 the online 
television channel, Peace TV, in addition to conventional print propaganda. 
At the same time, Zakir Naik’s project was a personal ministry, where his 
own religious persona became the main focus of his preaching. This format 
was also adopted by Wahiduddin Khan (born in 1925) who preaches a 
considerably less ideological, liberal and non-sectarian combination of 
Islamic scholarship, Sufi traditions, and New Age influences, especially by 
networking through his journal Al Risala.110 Khan enthusiastically embraced 
the new media and lectures live on Internet TV in English and Urdu.111 
Several clerics and preachers—Sufi and reformist alike—have followed this 
model, for instance the school and Sufi order of Hazrat Inam Hasan Gudri 
Shah Baba V in Ajmer.112 
Naik’s project became also a global ministry. Like Naik, many Indian 
Muslim groups and leaders developed expanding networks through 
diaspora connections and websites. This particularly applies to the United 
Kingdom and the United States, but also to other parts of the world where 
the Indian Muslim diaspora is strong, such as South Africa and Mauritius.113 
Yet Naik’s impact is inflated and twisted by the same media that has 
helped him to rise. Naik’s authority is hotly contested in India, to the extent 
that traditional groups have released fatwas targeting his arguments and 
technique of debate as un-Islamic. The unanimity with which this critique 
was voiced from the Deobandi, Barelwi, and even Ahl-i Hadith perspectives 
reflects not only the aspect of competition between Naik and the more 
traditional groups. It also demonstrates the limits of Naik’s religious 
authority which remains confined to particular sections of Muslim society 
with a modernist educational background.114 
Although Zakir Naik brought the use of these formats to certain perfec-
tion, he was by no means the first or only one in South Asian Islam going 
in this direction. The sect of the Ahmadiyya, seen as heretical by most 
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mainstream Muslims, first started a television channel for its followers in 
1994.115 Relayed over the Internet, the channel allowed the sect’s followers 
to receive messages irrespective of repressions and restrictions it faced in 
many countries.  
Many groups have established dedicated channels at YouTube, intro-
ducing video activism as a tool for Muslim mobilisation. Ahl-i Hadith 
scholars from India established a missionary center in Saudi Arabia, the 
Jeddah Dawah Center (JDC),116 which runs an Internet television channel 
on YouTube.com, Noor TV.117 Among the Tablighi Jama’at, the Deobandi-
dominated missionary movement that originally was hostile to media 
coverage, young lay preachers have became enthusiastic video activists, 
though less in India and more often in Great Britain and Pakistan.118 Barelwi 
activists also have started a dedicated Sunni channel on YouTube.com 
devoted to refuting sectarian opponents.119 
Competition in the faith market has become tough and tight. But as with 
all media revolutions, the resulting impact is not uniform. In some cases 
new media has exacerbated ideological and sectarian tension—for example, 
when Ahl-i Hadith preachers use their YouTube channel to vehemently 
attack the Tablighi Jama’at and its literature. In other cases, however, as 
with grassroots video activists of the Tablighi Jama’at, new media has 
challenged previous inhibitions towards picture and media content, thereby 
increasing knowledge and transparency. Even the current faction struggle 
can also be read as some form of internal democratisation allowing mem-
bers to have a voice in the shaping of their formats. The same applies to 
the website revolution among Islamic groups. For some groups, greater use 
of the Internet has increased the potential to attack adversaries, while 
others feel compelled to take a more pragmatic and open approach. 
Implications for the intersection of religion and politics 
Currently no charismatic national Muslim leaders on a popular level are 
visible in India. Despite the growing prominence of individual leaders such 
as Asaduddin Owaisi, Muslim leadership and religious authority in India are 
still essentially local, whether conservative or progressive, reformist or Sufi, 
political or social and cultural. Given the diversity and fragmentation of 
Indian Muslims, this is not likely to change anytime soon. 
At the same time, the choice of ministries has dramatically increased. 
Traditional Muslim networks have used the opportunities provided by the 
media and globalisation age to revive their hold on their adherents. But so 
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too have new activists managed to establish themselves successfully in the 
Islamic field, notably from the SIO.  
More than anything else, Islamic action and debate in India are framed 
by the social and economic condition of the Muslim community. Muslim 
clerics and intellectuals increasingly go public with their positions and 
demands. The lines of distinction between religious, social, and political 
activism have grown more blurred than before. Muslims are availing of the 
public and democratic space in India not only to secure and defend their 
rights but also to propagate their views in all their diversity.  
Although the main national political parties will not likely be replaced in 
the representation of Muslim interests, on a local and regional level Muslim 
leaders will increasingly act independently. They will thus strengthen com-
munal politics but also contribute to empowering marginalised sections of 
society. It will depend on the major political parties how well this potential 
for mobilisation is successfully integrated into the mainstream.  
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